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1971] NOTES
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND V. HOERNER WALDORF
CORPORATION:' ENVIRONMENT, INDUSTRY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Environmental Defense Fund2 (EDF), a New York Corporation,
recently brought a class action 3 against the Hoerner Waldorf Corpora-
tion4 in the United States District Court in Missoula, Montana. EDF re-
quested both a temporary injunction, pending the final determination
of the action, and a permanent injunction restraining Hoerner Waldorf
from emitting noxious sulfur compounds and other toxic compounds with-
in the Missoula Regional Ecosystem.5 EDF alleged that the rights of
the members of the class were guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. It was further alleged that the emissions vio-
lated the Federal Civil Rights Act. 6
The action presented several novel claims that could be of impor-
tance in the defense of our environment. The court was required to de-
cide whether an environmental group had standing to sue a private in-
dustry allegedly violating rights of a large class of individuals. The is-
sue had not previously been decided. The court was asked to decide
whether a class action could be brought by non-members of the class.
'Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corporation, No. 1694 (D.
Mont. Aug. 25, 1970).
'Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. (EDF) is a non-profit, public-benefit membership
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of New York. It is made up of scientists and other citizens dedicated to the protection
of man's environment. EDF serves as the legal action arm of environmental scientists
throughout the United States, and seeks to establish, through appropriate litigation,
a body of common law under which the general public can assert its constitutional
right to a viable, clean and healthy environment. Plaintiff's Complaint at 4;
Hoerner-Waldorf, supra note 1.
"Members of the class entitled to the full benefit, use, and enjoyment of the natural
resource that is the Missoula Regional Ecosystem are those individuals who are
included as residents or invited as visitors to the ecosystem by the Missoula Chamber
of Commerce. Residents include those in the metropolitan area, in the primary trade
area, and out-of-town University Students. Plaintiff 's Answers to Defendant's Inter-
rogatories at 4, 5, Hoerner-Waldorf, supra note 1.
'Hoerner Waldorf Corporation is a Kraft process pulp-and-paper mill, incorporated
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware. Hoerner Waldorf Corpora-
tion operates a plant about ten miles west of Missoula, Montana, which emits the
alleged undesirable sulphuric compounds into the atmosphere.
'The Missoula Regional Ecosystem is a complex ecological system. It includes the
atmosphere as well as surface and subsurface components, air, soil, and water. Surface
boundaries include those portions of the Missoula area which are affected by the
Missoula Basin air shed. These areas are identified as being within the confines of
the normal valley inversion range. The altitude of the inversion base is subject to
-variation, but it is normally 800 feet above the central valley floor. The defined
area includes the northern portion of the Bitterroot Valley, the Clark-Fork Valley,
the Jocko Valley, the Blackfoot Valley and the Rattlesnake Valley. It also includes
portions of the Bitterroot National Forest, Lolo National Forest, the Flathead Indian
Reservation, and the National Bison Range. Plaintiff's Complaint at 5 and Plain-
tiff's Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories at 6-11, Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1.
'42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983. Judge Murray held that § 1983 requires the same state
action as that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that § 1981 provides
equality of rights as between persons of different races.
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Dicta in a recent case appears to suggest that possibility.7 The Court was
asked to find that environmental rights were protected by the United
States Constitution, although such rights have not presently been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally the court
was asked to find that violations of Constitutional environmental rights
by private industry could be protected.
Judge Murray found the case to be an improper class action but held
that EDF had standing to bring a "public interest lawsuit. '"8 Judge
Murray, in dictum, said:
I have no difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and
property are constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments provide that those rights may not be denied
without due process of law, and surely a person's health is what,
in a most significant degree, sustains life.
So it seems to me that each of us is constitutionally protected in our
natural and personal state of life and health.'
The case was dismissed because the governmental action, either federal
or state, required for an action based on the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments was lacking in the case.
STANDING: THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS1 °
Judge Murray held that a class action could not be brought by one
who is not a member of the class he alleges to represent." He noted that
dicta in Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency1 2 has sug-
gested otherwise but felt that the language was not persuasive. EDF did
not allege itself to be a member of the class, and therefore could not
bring the class action."l Judge Murray did not, however, deny standing
but said that if the case was not dismissed on some other ground ". . . the
court would permit the plaintiff to amend by striking the class action
and bring the suit as a public interest lawsuit... ''14 Judge Murray
noted a contemporary trend in the law of standing and found that EDF
had ". . . standing to bring a non-class representation action on behalf
of a public interest."13
7Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).8Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1 at 2.
Id. at 4.
"
0for an in-depth discussion on the topic of standing see Note, Standing: Who Speaks
for the Environment, supra p. at 130. Standing will be discussed here summarily
only with reference to this case.
nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a) provides: "One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued . . . . " (emphasis provided). That one be a member of the
class he alleges to represent has been a universal requirement, e.g., Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 391 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Board of Education, 365 F.2d 770, 777
(8th Cir. 1960); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 355, 357 (M.D.Ga. 1963).
"-Norwalk Core, supra note 7 at 937. The court said:
We think that the reasons for requiring an individual plaintiff in a class action
to be a member of the class do not necessarily preclude an association from repre-
senting a class where its raison d'etre is to represent the interests of that class.18Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1 at 3.
1Id.
2d.
[Vol. 32
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Standing to sue, arising from the Constitutional requirement that
the litigation be a "case" or "controversy "16 would traditionally be lack-
ing in a case brought by a public-interest group, asserting the aesthetic
rights of the public.17 In 1968, the Supreme Court recognized more lib-
eral bases than those previously required for standing in Flast v. Cohen.18
The Flast Case, though narrowly limited to a taxpayer's standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of federal expenditures, overruled an earlier
decision which would have denied standing to the claimants.', The court
required, not that the claimant allege personal economic injury but, that
he show a "personal stake" in the outcome of the controversy.
Recently in Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp2° and
Barlow v. Collins2' the Supreme Court rejected the standing require-
ment of a "recognized legal interest.' '22 Mr. Justice Brennan, concur-
ring and dissenting to both cases, joined by Mr. Justice White, suggested
that "injury in fact" should be the sole test for determining standing.21
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C.2 4 in 1965, evi-
denced the beginning of a trend toward more liberal standing require-
ments in the Second Circuit Federal Courts. In the Scenic Hudson Case
the court held that to be "case" or "controversy" ". . . does not re-
quire that an aggrieved or adversely affected party have a personal eco-
nomic interest.' '25 The holding has been applied in several subsequent
cases in the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, which were cited by
Judge Murray as displaying the "contemporary trend. "26
All of the cases that have allowed an environmental concern to bring
a "public interest lawsuit" have been against federal governmental agen-
cies,27 and all of the cases have been governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act.28 . In no reported case has a public interest action been
brought against a private concern, and the issues raised are relatively
new.
'
6U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; e.g., Nashville, C.&St.L.Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).17Traditionally, in order that a party have standing, a personal monetary interest was
required. E.g., Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118
(1939).
'Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
'
9Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. CHi. L. REv. 601 (1968).
'Data Processing Service Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
'Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
SCamp, supra note 20 at 153.
"Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167 (1970), Brennan J., joint concurring and dissenting opinion
in Camp and Barlow.
2"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
'Id. at 615.
"The following were the cases cited as reflecting the trend: EDF v. Secretary of
Agriculture, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson, supra
note 24.
nSee cases cited, supra notes 20, 21, 26.
-5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706.
1.971]
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Very recently, in Sierra Club v. Hickle,2 9 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals denied standing to the Sierra Club, who was attempting to
enjoin the issuance of permits by the Department of the Interior for com-
mercial-recreational development of public land. The suit was brought
against a federal governmental agency, but the court made it clear that
EDF would not have standing in the Hoerner Waldorf Case. In distin-
guishing other cases where the Sierra Club had standing" the court said:
In almost every carefully considered case where standing is sus-
tained it is apparent in the facts or in the opinion that when the
situation of the plaintiff is examined there is an element of legal
wrong being afflicted upon him or he is adversely affected by the
agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant
statute. That adverse affect . . .is the element which appellee fails
to sufficiently allege in its complaint and support by its exhibits
attached.
The right to sue does not inure to one who does not possess it,
simply because there is no one else willing and able to assert if."
EDF was not joined by a local concern, as required by the court in
the Sierra Club Case. That case is being appealed and it is possible that
the Supreme Court will find that an environmental group has standing
to bring a "public interest lawsuit" against a governmental agency with-
out an element of legal wrong being afflicted upon hin. Whether stand-
ing will extend to an environmental concern suing a private party will
not be answered.
At present several things are clear: There is no precedent for grant-
ing standing to an environmental concern bringing a "public interest
lawsuit" against a private industry; there is a "contemporary trend"
in the law of standing,32 and standing has been granted to environmental
groups suing governmental agencies in the public interest; and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals would not allow an environmental group to
bring a "public interest lawsuit," even against a governmental agency,
unless the group or a party joined in the action has a personal interest
in the outcome of the suit.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE COURT'S RECOGNITION
Regardless of the propriety of the court's refusal to dismiss for lack
of standing, that determination allowed the court in the Hoerner Wal-
dorf Case, to make an unprecedented determination of the validity of the
Constitutional claims made by EDF. Violation of Constitutional rights
has not been asserted to any great extent against polluters.
'Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, (9th Cir. 1970).
OD(itizens Comm., supra note 26; Parker v. United States, 307 F.Supp. 685 (D.Colo.
1969). Sierra Club was joined as plaintiff in both cases.
-'Sierra Club, supra note 29 at 32.
'See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 450 (1970); Rogers,
The Need for Meaningful Control in the Management of Federally Owned Timberlands,
4 LAND & WATER L. Rv. 121, 136-143 (1969).
[Vol. 32
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Judge Murray did not recognize broad rights, but did recognize a
right to health implicit in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.3  This recognition was merely dictum for requisite gov-
ernmental action was not sufficiently alleged. Environmental rights
might be available in the Ninth Amendment,3 4 but again governmental
action is required. Judge Murray did not recognize Ninth Amendment
Rights but stated:
It seems clear also, though the point has never been decided by the
Supreme Court, that the Ninth Amendment is a limitation upon the
powers and conduct of the federal government and by the Four-
teenth Amendment such limitation is extended to the power of the
state.'
The Ninth Amendment has been called the "Forgotten Amend-
ment, '"36 the "Neglected Amendment'' 3 7 and has been referred to as an
area "better left in tranquility."-" Though there has not been broad rec-
ognition of rights through the Ninth Amendment,3 9 the right to an en-
vironment free from substantial and unnecessary degradation, as alleged
by EDF, could be a ". . . right retained by the people."
'40
There had been little litigation before Griswold v. Connecticut41 in
which the Ninth Amendment had been discussed. The Griswold Case
challenged the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
use of contraceptives or their prescription by physicians. The court was
required to determine whether the statute was unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, recognized
that there were "penumbral" rights broader than those specific rights
in the first eight amendments. The Ninth Amendment was merely men-
tioned, but the court implied that there are "penumbral" rights within
the Ninth Amendment. The court decided that the right to privacy in
marriage was one "penumbral" right which should be applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
'Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1 at 4.
"The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparge others retained by the people.'
'Hoernre Waldorf, supra note 1 at 4.
"Patterson, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955).
'Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the
People, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 121 (1968).
'Note, The Uncertain Renissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814,
815 (1966).
'Since Griswold, infra note 41, there has been very little recognition of Ninth Amend-
ment Rights. See, Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. F.C.C., 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310
F.Supp. 248, 252 (D.Neb. 1970); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293 (E.D.Wis.
1970); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.Supp. 524 (E.D.La. 1967). These cases have been
careful not to say specifically that they are recognizing Ninth Amendment Rights.
nor have they denied such rights.
"0See quoted material, supra note 34.
"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Before the Griswold case the Ninth
Amendment had been referred to only in Both v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ;
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947) ; Tennessee Electric
Powers Co., supra note 17; Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 330-331 (1936).
1971.]
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Mr. Justice Goldberg concurring, found that the "right to marital
privacy" was protected by the Ninth Amendment.
The language and the history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that
the framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional
fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically men-
tioned in the first eight consitutional amendments."
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, felt that the Ninth Amendment was
passed ". . . not to broaden the powers of this court or any other depart-
ment of the General Government, but, ... to limit the Federal Govern-
ment to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication.''
43
Environmental rights have not been recognized through the Ninth
Amendment. Although such recognition is entirely possible, a majority
of the Supreme Court must first recognize that the Ninth Amendment
supports "basic" rights.
4 4
Recognition of broad rights under the Ninth Amendment will not
automatically make them applicable to the states, as noted by Judge Mur-
ray.45 Application of Ninth Amendment rights, from all indications in
the Griswold Case,46 must therefore comply with the rules set out by the
Supreme Court for their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although environmental rights seem to be "basic," they were not
specifically recognized in the Constitution of the United States. Absent
the recognition of the rights by the Supreme Court of the United States,
broad recognition and acceptance of such rights will be slow in coming.
DISMISSAL: FAILURE TO FIND GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
The Constitution of the United States, by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, clearly protects individuals from a deprivation of life with-
out due process. 47 The Fifth Amendment has clearly been limited to ac-
2Griswold, supra note 41 at 493.
4Id. at 520, Black, J. Dissenting.
"4Mr. Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren, who both believed that Ninth Amend-
ment rights should have been recognized in Griswold, are no longer on the court.
Mr. Justice Clark who joined in the opinion of the court, has retired. The outcome
of future litigation based on Ninth Amendment rights is not predictable at the
present time.
15Hoerner Waldorf, supra note I at 4.
"None of the opinions in Griswold suggested that recognition of Ninth Amendment
rights should be applied to the states except through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See e. g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937).
"The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "... nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." The Fifth
Amendment provides: ''No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ..."
[Vol. 32
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tion by the Federal Government4 s and the Fourteenth Amendment to ac-
tions by the state government. 49
State action has been defined broadly, so that action by a Corpora-
tion or an individual clothed with the State's power, is the act of the
state.-0 Suits alleging violative state action have been allowed directly
against the private corporation or individual.5 1
Finding state action to be involved to a sufficient degree is, and
probably will continue to be, the most difficult obstacle facing those as-
serting Constitutional rights against private industry. Recognition of
Constitutional rights in the environment, will not automatically make
them applicable to industry-the real question is state action.
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed shortly after the termina-
tion of slavery,52 and it has been asserted primarily in civil rights cases.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects only against action of the state.53
State action has been found: in the acts of municipalities, which are po-
litical subdivisions of the state ;54 in acts that are controlled by municipal
ordinances ;55 where unconstitutional actions of individuals have been
enforced in state courts ;56 in the actions of public utilities ;57 in the un-
constitutional regulations of a state agency;58 in the discriminatory ac-
tions of a State Dental Society ;59 in the actions of a local law officer,
when working in purportedly official capacity on off duty hours;6° in
the acts of those receiving substantial funds allocated by a state agency ;1
in the acts of discrimination by a High School Athletic Association ;62
in the acts of discrimination on parklands, not owned, but maintained
"E.g., Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243
(1833).
"Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 47.
1'E.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co.. ...... U.S ....... , 90 S.Ct. 1598 (1970); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
nE.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
'E.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See also, Fernandez, The Constitution-
ality of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 378 (1966).
"Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 49. See also, cases cited, infra notes 54-67.
"E.g., Avery v. Midland County Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 478 (1968); Evans v. Newton
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 674 (1922).
'E.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106 (1939).
"E.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
57Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
'E.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
'Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966). The powers
of the dental society were originally sanctioned by the state legislature.
"Griffen v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
"E.g., Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Association, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969);
Foster v. Mobile County Hospital Board, 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); Smith v.
Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Simpkins v.
Mose H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Cf., Browns v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Crossner v. Trustees of Columbia University,
287 F.Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Louisiana High School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1968).
19711
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by the city;63 in the actions of political parties in primary elections;64
in the actions of persons leasing state land ;65 in the actions of an adver-
tising company under contract with a city transit authority;66 and in
the acts of a state taking a neutral position in housing discrimination by
abolishing existing law.67
It is clear that the Supreme Court of the United States "'. . . has
never attempted the impossible task of formulating an infallible test for
determining whether the state in any of its manifestations has become
significantly involved in private discriminations. ''68 The court is re-
quired to look at the individual act, and ". . . only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances [can the court] determine whether the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment extends to a particular case." 69
The fact that a state officer abuses his power,7 0 or acts in violation
of state law7'1 has had no effect on a determination of state action. Whether
an unconstitutional act ". . . is compelled by a statutory provision or by
custom having the force of law-in either case it is the state that has
commanded the result by its law."2
It has always been the view of the court that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not protect against private conduct however wrongful.7 3 The
involvement of the state, however, need be neither exclusive nor direct.7 4
Supreme Court cases have held that action by the state, being only one
of several forces including apparent individual action, is sufficient state
action to fulfill the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.75
Mr. Justice Douglas, in Reitman v. Mulkey,7 6 appeared to suggest
that the mere licensing of a corporation by the state could make the ac-
tions of the corporation those of the state.77 The theory is probably limited
3Hadnott v. City of Pratville, 390 F.Supp. 967 (M.D.Ala. 1970).
"E.g., Grey v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Baskins v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); of., Grovey v. Townsend, 269 U.S.
45 (1935).
'Burton, supra note 51; Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F.Supp. 698 (S.D.Ga. 1969);
Smith v. City of Birmingham, 226 F.Supp. 838 (N.D.Ala. 1963).
6Kissinger v. N.Y. City Transit Authority, 274 F.Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369. See also, Avins et. al., Comments on Mulkey v.
ieitman, a Recent Development in "State Action" Theory, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1966).
OReitman, supra note 67 at 378.
OEvans, supra note 54 at 299.
n°E.g., Adickes, supra note 50 at 1605; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960);
Home Telegraph v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Baldwin v. Morgan,
251 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1958).
nAdickes, supra note 50 at 1615; Raines, supra note 70; see also Lombard v. State
of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
*Adickes, supra note 50 at 1615.
"Adickes, supra note 50 at 1615; United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Evans,
..supra note 54; United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1909).
"Adickes, supra note 50 at 1606; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Price,
supra note 73.
71E.g., Evans, supra note 54; Robinson, supra note 58; Griffin, supra note 60; Lom-
bard, supra note 71; Burton, supra note 51; Shelly, supra note 56.
7Reitman, supra note 67 at 384-387 (Douglas J. concurring).
7Id. at 384-87.
[Vol. 32
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to those situations where a license is given to someone whom the state
has reason to believe will violate the Constitutional rights of others. The
theory has not been discussed by the Supreme Court and broad conten-
tions of a "license theory" have been rejected by the lower federal courts."8
Mere involvement by the state with an individual is not sufficient.
In order that the act complained of be unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment there must be ". . . state involvement in the conduct
complained of. . .. ',79 State action need not be involved to the point of
requiring the act but it must allow the act and be involved in it. s0
EDF did not allege that federal action was involved in the pollution
by Hoerner Waldorf. EDF alleged for the purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment argument, that public property was being damaged, and conse-
quently being taken by Hoerner Waldorf Co., and that this was in vio-
lation of the Public Trust Doctrine."' This doctrine is generally asserted
when public land is to be used by the Federal Government for undesir-
able purposes, 8s and therefore inapplicable in this instance.
EDF alleged as state action that The Missoula Chamber of Com-
merce and the Mayor of Missoula invited Hoerner Waldorf to operate in
Missoula; the State Planning Board invited and encouraged acceptance
of Missoula as a plant cite; the state licensed the corporation to do busi-
ness in the state, according to state law ;13 and the state failed to abate
the alleged pollution.
8 4
.That 'subdivision developers were licensed to engage in business and made use of
services of numerous other businesses which were licensed and regulated by the state,
did not render the defendant's refusal to sell a house and lot to Negroes as "dis-
criminatory state action". Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 225 F.Supp. 115 (E.D.Mo.
1966). The case was reversed on the grounds that state action was not a necessary
requirement, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). License given by the state to construct and oper-
ate an oil refinery did not cause action of the refinery to be state action. Miner v.
Commerce Oil Refining Corp., 198 P.Supp. 887, 891 (D.R.I. 1961), reversed on pro-
cedural grounds, 303 F.2d 125 (lst Cir. 1962). The mere fact that a race track was
licensed by the state did not cause discriminatory actions of the officers to be state
action. Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F.Supp. 1006, 1016 (D.Ark. 1949),
affirmed on appeal with no discussion of the "license theory", 183 F.2d 440 (8th
Cir. 1950).
19Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant of Wash., 323 F.2d 102, 107 (4th Cir.
1963). See also, Williams v. Howard Johnson Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir.
1959); Crossner, supra note 61; Rogers v. Provident Hospital, 241 F.Supp. 633, 636
(N.D.Ill. 1965); No case has found sufficient state action when the action of the
state is not involved in the unconstitutional conduct.
Crossner, supra note 61. See also Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 1081 (1960); Avins, State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 MERCER
L. REV. 352 (1966).
BSar, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Laws Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
"Id.
"REVISED CODES OP MONTANA, § 15-1701 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.1947].
"Plaintiff 's -Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Hoerner Waldorf
at 21, 22; Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1 at 4.
197.1]
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EDF attempted to equate the actions of the State Planning Board
to the actions of the state in leasing space in a city parking garage"-
and the failure to abate the problem to acquiescence in the face of
prohibitive law.
The allegations of state action were weak, and probably could not
have encompassed, at the time, more than they did. The state was not in
any of the alleged acts, directly involved in the conduct complained of.
Judge Murray noted:
None of the actions alleged here partake of those affirmative or
permissive actions which are designed to violate constitutional rights.
The activities of State Planning Boards and City Commissions may
well constitute state actions, but to support a Ninth or Fourteenth
Amendment suit, the action of the state must be unconstitutional or
the proximate cause of unconstitutional action, and the court can
find no such unconstitutional action from the allegations here."
Had this action been brought after July 10, 1970, it is likely that
the court could have found state action in the emissions of Hoerner Wal-
dorf Co. On July 10, 1970, the Montana State Board of Health, in com-
pliance with Montana's Clean Air Act, 7 granted to Hoerner Waldorf, a
variance from the pollution standards the board had set. The Board
specifically found:
• . . [T]he particulate matter controls now in use at the Hoerner
Waldorf Plant are not sufficient to comply with the Board's Regula-
tion 90-004, which was effective as of June 1, 1970. If the plant is
not to be operated in violation of this Regulation, either it must be
shut down entirely for more than two years, pending the completion
of the new system, or it must be operated under the exemption al-
lowed by the law.'
Hoerner Waldorf is presently operating under the exemption which
the Board granted. A state agency took direct action in and not only al-
lowed the emissions complained of by not enforcing standards which it
had set, but sanctioned the emissions. The state has now become a joint
participant in the acts of emitting undesirable substances into the at-
mosphere. The acts of Hoerner Waldorf in that respect are now the acts
of the state.
In addition to Regulation 90-004 requiring all industry to comply
with standards set by the Board of Health, Regulation 90-001 requires
that:
Burton, supra note 51. In Burton the court said:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State has not only made itself
a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence . . . that it must be recognized as a joint par-
ticipant in the challenged activity. Id. at 725.
The actions of the Parking Authority were clearly more involved with private un-
constitutional actions than those of the State Planning Board in Hoerner Waldorf.
The language above would appear clearly to show state action in the actions of the
Monatna State Board of Health.
'Hoerner Waldorf, supra note 1 at 5.
rR.C.M.1947, §§ 69-3904-69-3923.
1Findings of Fact and Order Granting Exemption, Montana State Board of Health,
Application of Hoerner Waldorf Corporation, at 3 (July 10, 1970).
[Vol. 32
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NOTES
A permit shall be required from the director of the Division of Air
Pollution Control and Industrial Hygiene, Montana State Depart-
ment of Health for the construction, installation or alteration of
any new equipment or changes of process capable of emitting air
contaminants into the atmosphere and any new, altered or revised
equipment intended for eliminating, reducing or controlling emission
of air contaminants from . . . [specific classes of operation].'
The grant of a permit to any new industry covered by the regula-
tion will again constitute state action. This permit will be applicable to
the new pollution control equipment being installed at Hoerner Waldorf.
CONCLUSION
The increase in environmental litigation is evidence of the concern
expressed by many today for the future of our environment. Scientific
predictions of this planet's future are frightening. Some authorities con-
tend that the answer to the dilemma is in the courtroom.9 0 To successfully
abate the problem, however, it is necessary to have the support of every
person. Saving the environment will require money and sacrifice but time
is scarce91
Although private industry is responsible for a great deal of the en-
vironmental degradation, industry cannot be abolished. A reasonable, just,
and immediate means of attack must be found. Perhaps action asserting
Constitutional rights fulfills this objective. Though now unsuccessful,
broad environmental rights may be recognized, and finding state action
to be involved will become less difficult with the enactment of stringent
state legislation.
The Hoerner Waldorf Case, though dismissed, explored one possible
means of attack. EDF sought relief on Constitutional grounds, an un-
precedented area. The case is especially important because it reached the
Constitutional issue. The court recognized a "contemporary trend" and
refused to find that the environmental group lacked standing to bring
a "public interest lawsuit."
Judge Murray could not sustain an action based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, for the actions of Hoerner Waldorf did not constitute "state
action." He did, in dictum, recognize a right to health, implicit in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The case was dismissed, but it did constitute a beginning. Although
the case was not appealed, it presents a beginning for recognition of Con-
"Regulation No. 90-001, Montana State Board of Health, Air Pollution Control, Con-
struction and Operating Permits. The Regulation was passed in compliance with
R.C.M.1947, § 69-3911.
"°Can Law Reclaim Man's Environment, TRIAL 10 (August/September, 1969); Esposito,
Air and Water Pollution: What to do while Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIOHTS Civ. LIBERTIES L. REV. 32 (1970); Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected
Environment, 56 Vni. L. REV. 458 (1970).
O'Can Law Reclaim Man's Environment, supra note 90 at 10-28.
1n71.]
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stitutional rights in the environment, and a beginning for future federal
legislation based upon those rights.
92
Most of what Judge Murray said in the case was dictum. The case
and the issues were new, and although much more could have been said,
it could not have been expected. The case is important for the pressure
that it placed on industry. Thus the foundations of attack on the con-
stitutionality of the actions of private industry have been presented. It
remains to be seen whether this attack will be successful.
JOSEPH E. MUDD
"Under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Congress may
legislate for protection of the rights of United States citizens against interference
by private conduct. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. "641 (1966); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 32
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JOHN P. ACHER
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